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FIRMS' BANMKRUPTCY AND TURNOVER IN A
MACROECONOMY
,QWURGXFWLRQ
The so-called "rational expectations revolution" that has
completely reshaped economic theory and general equilibrium theory in
the last two decades has, incidentally, brought earlier ideas on the
crucial importance of agents' knowledge, information and beliefs to the
forefront forcing modern followers of those ideas to reconsider them far
more deeply, systematically and rigorously (Arrow (1986), Hahn (1977,
1981)). It soon turned out that when agents act upon beliefs and engage
in out-of-equilibrium learning, heterogeneity (of beliefs) and self-
referentiality (of market outcomes)1 may determine large sets of
multiple equilibria, and of dynamic paths of the economy, which
collapse onto the unique RE competitive general equilibrium only under
a number of restrictive conditions (Frydman-Phelps (1983), Kirman
(1987, 1992), Pesaran (1987), Bray-Kreps (1986), Marcet-Sargent
(1989), Arthur (1992)).
The fact that expectations, let alone out-of-equilibrium beliefs
and learning, may give rise to mistakes in decision-making2, has
however been much less considered, and the implications of this fact at
the individual as well as systemic level even less investigated.  Rational
(in a broad sense) expectations are rooted in knowledge, and knowledge
is an evolving-adaptive mental representation of the external
                                               
1A self-referential system is such that the actual value of a variable is a
function of its expected value in the population, which is a function of the
distribution of beliefs in the population. See e.g. Pesaran (1987) and Frydman
(1983) for introductory treatment.
2A fact quite clear even under the strong RE hypothesis, which states that
asymptotically decisions are not wrong in a systematic manner but does not
state that they are systematically right (Lucas (1981)).
4environment (e.g. Lucas (1987), Arthur (1992), Holland (1975)). Trials
and errors are an integral part of the evolutionary-adpative process that
builds up our knowledge (Holland (1975)). Even in the most formal
models of this process, from Bayesian to stochastic recursive ones (e.g.
Bray-Kreps (1986), Marcet-Sargent (1989)), errors paly a crucial
informative role in steering the process itself.  Yet errors not only bring
benefits but also costs. In particular, models of expectations formation
in economics usually do not include the possibility that decision-makers
may fail, that failures are generally costly, that they may happen to be
fatal, and that the birth-death turnover of agents may change the
environment structure. It is surprising that economic theorists have
tended to overlook these facts since "paying for one's mistakes" is a
building block of the capitalist way of living, of market ethics and
organization, and of Darwinian evolutionary explanations of individual
rationality and market efficiency (Alchian (1950), Friedman (1949)).
Hence, the possibility of costly errors should have consequences on
individual economic behaviour as well as on aggregate outcomes of
individual decisions3. Here we concentrate in particular on one extreme
                                               
3At the individual level, the possibility of costly errors is only
apparently dealt with by the standard expected-utility approach to risk
aversion. This approach may properly explain how much expected
utility an individual is ready to forego in order to receive a
compensation in all future states that entail a utility loss to him/her.
Yet ex-ante utility equalization across states is a peculiar representation
in that it disregards other important attributes of rational behaviour in
the face of costly errors. Consider the case pointed out by Hicks (1951)
and Roy (1952) at the dawn of modern portfolio theory. An investor
faces a small probability of a large loss: if the related expected-utility
loss is "very" large or "disastrous", no compensation may exist so that
the expected-utility approach easily breaks down. Bankruptcy is a
leading example of such extreme events which is nonetheless quite
common in economic life and is commonly taken as a risk by
businessmen. The objection that in large (in the limit complete) markets
by virtue of diversification and risk sharing no one in fact bets a "very"
large share of one's wealth on extreme events does not lead us very far.
5consequence of economic errors that nonetheless lies at the very core of
business life: bankruptcy.
By bankruptcy we simply mean a firm's foreclosure and exit from
the market. We speak of bankruptcy because firms in our model are
indebted with a bank. Technically, this event may take different forms
that are irrelevant for this paper's purposes. What is essential is that a
firm may be forced to leave the market as a consequence of wrong
decisions, where a firm is identified by its "software", not its
"hardware"4. Although we model firms as decision makers that discount
the probability of this event, our interest is not for the consequences of
bankruptcy at the firm level (on which an enormous literature exists
involving law, buisiness finance and business administration) but at the
economy level, particularly in a general-equilibrium perspective, where
the literature is instead scant (e.g. Hahn (1977), Greenwald-Stiglitz
(1988, 1990, 1993), Hahn-Solow (1995)). How does an economic system
work when the fact that the firms' population displays a certain birth-
death rate is introduced?
We focus on three moments when the problem arises. When
forming expectations under uncertainty, firms' rational decision makers
(entrepreneurs) should discount the probability of making fatal
mistakes that lead to bankruptcy. Moreover, only survivors have a
                                                                                                                       
As a matter of fact, markets are far from being complete, especially in
consideration of innovative investments. Moreover, most businesses are
run by undiversified owners while even in quoted public companies
important classes of stakeholders (such as managers and employees) are
"locked in" for a large share of their permanent income (a fact worsened
by current practices like stock options and Enron-style finance). In all
these and similar cases, rational risk-taking has to be the result of
calculations and decisions that differ from those prescribed by the
expected-utility approach. Research in this field, which is
complementary to the work reported in this paper, is not presented
here.
4Hence takeovers may be an alternative way to introduce the same event.
6chance to learn and improve over their previous decisions. Finally, at
any point in time the agents' population in an economy consists of
"learned" survivors from the past and "ignorant" newcomers that take
over failed agents; hence we expect the aggregate outcome at that point
time to differ from the one given by a uniform population, and we expect
it to evolve over time in a way that differs from the one traced out by
the asymptotic "free lunch" error processing à la Lucas-Sargent.
 We address these problems by means of a model whose main
features are:
• heterogenous population (i.e. heteregenous beliefs about the
relevant variable, the price level of output)
• sequential decision making
• self-referentiality
• a positive probability of bankruptcy for firms at each point in time
Our model draws on Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988, 1993). In each
period t there exists a constant population of a continuum of agents
(workers and entrepreneurs) which live for two periods, and a
government inclusive of a central bank that live forever. Agents
consume one single good which is distributed as endowment at birth
and can also be produced by means of a technology requiring 1 period of
production regardless of the scale, with one single input (labour) with
decreasing return. All transactions in the economy should take place
against money according to the so-called "Clower rule".
Hence, entrepreneurs who want to run a firm should receive
credit from a bank to pay the wage bill. We straightforwardly assume a
single central bank which issues standard debt contracts with the
exclusion of any risk on the part of the bank. This type of debt contract
is a crucial element in our picture since it introduces a bankruptcy
clause in case of insolvency, and hence the selction mechanism in the
population of firms.
This mechanism is not due to exogenous shocks like in
Greenwald-Stiglitz's original models but it is "endogenous" in the sense
that it is the direct consequence of entrepreneurs' heterogeneous beliefs
7on the price generating machanism after observing a common external
signal given by the rate of growth of money supply. These beliefs
generate a continuum of individual expected, or better "conjectured",
prices to which we impose the shape of a uniform distribution.
Individual expected prices are strictly private information. We identify
a given generation of entrepreneurs by three population's parameters:
the mean value, the dispersion and the tolerance level of their expected
prices. Since individual expected prices are private information, the
popolution's parameters are unknown to individual agents. Then we
show that, at the market-clearing price in t+1, there will go bankrupt all
the t-th generation's entrepreneurs whose expected price exceeds a
threshold value which is a function of the three population's
parameters. In other words, we might say that whether a firm fails or
not in this economy only depends on relative expected prices.
As far as a single generation is concerned, we study:
• the price determination mechanism under firms' failure
• the ensuing relationship between the price level and the rate of
money supply in comparison with its "fundamental" value that
would result under homogeneous rational expectations
• the relationship between the price level and the populations'
parameters, in particular the mean value of expected prices
• the relationship between the population's parameters and the
bankruptcy probability
We then move towards the dynamics of our model economy as
bankrupt firms are driven out of the market and newcomers enter.
Reshuffling of population in each period has two consequences: first, it
preserves hetereogeneity, second, it changes the economy's structure for
incumbent firms. Therefore,
• the process driving changes in the price level over time, for a given
money growth rate, is fully determined by the population's dynamics
and, under our assumptions, is totally hidden from individual
agents' view
8• successful beliefs in one period may no longer be such in the
subsequent period
At the present stage of development of our research, we limit
ourselves to the analysis of the implications of self-referentiality under
the population dynamics generated by exits and entries with no specific
assumptions on learning. Newcomers that take over bankrupt firms are
characterized by beliefs drawn from the same uniform distribution as
the previous generation, whereas we substantially rule out incumbents'
learning by assuming that all entrepreneurs in solvent firms do not
revise the previous generation's successful belief. This implies that
previous generations' successful beliefs have a growing weight, and that
the distribution of beliefs is no longer uniform, as the population evolves
over time. We then study
• the dynamics and the asymptotic properties of this evolution
mechanism
• its consequences on price level determination and bankruptcy
probability over time
• and in particular whether in the long run bankruptcies tend to
disappear or to settle down in a "structural"  limit-level.
7KHPRGHOHFRQRP\
We consider a sequential monetary economy of production and
consumption. Time is introduced in discrete periods indexed by t. In
each period t there exists a constant population of a continuum of
agents A which live for two periods, and a government G inclusive of a
central bank B that live forever. Agents consume one single good which
is distributed as endowment at birth and can also be produced by means
of a technology requiring 1 period of production regardless of the scale
with one single input (labour) with decreasing return. All transactions
9in the economy should take place against money according to the so-
called "Clower rule"5.
2.1. Agents and institutions
•  Each agent in the population, a ∈ A, has a lifetime horizon of two
periods: one period of activity (t), and one period of retirement (t+1); at
birth each agent receives a given quantity of the consumable good as
endowment, which is fixed for all a and t
• There are two classes in the population that differ in their
endowments: the "poor" have an endowment just equal to the
subsistance level, x; the "rich" have a quantity of the consumable good
that exceeds x
• Endowments predetermine the agents' activity choices: the poor, if
they wish to consume in both periods of life, can only be workers, a = w,
w ∈ A, with xw = x; the rich may choose to be entrepreneurs, a = j, j ∈ A,
with xj > x; for simplicity and without loss of generality we assume that
the measure of the two classes of agents, W and J respectively, is equal
and constant over time
• All agents are risk neutral.
The poor's choice is constrained by their endowent which is just
sufficient to their subsistance in the first period. If they wish to
consume in the second period they have to sell all their labour force in
the labour market, earn a wage, and transfer it to the second period for
consumption6. The rich may choose to run a firm by transforming the
                                               
5We assume this rule as an insititutional fact which is typical of monetary
economies, and which we do not wish to explain here. We are instead interested
in investigating the consequences of this fact as concerns the working of the
economy.
6For simplicity we do not model the possible choices of workers concerning
work and leisure and the time distribution of consumption of wage earnings.
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excess of their endowment over subsistance in the first period into a
production means in the way that will be explained below. The incentive
for the rich to become entrepreneurs is given by the prospect of adding
their firm's second-period profit to their total resources. Given risk-
neutrality, any positive expected profit is sufficient for the rich to choose
to be entrepreneurs. This choice is also Pareto improving since it allows
the poor to become workers and to consume in the second period.
Pareto-improving transactions between the two classes in the
economy require that the labour market opens at each t when newborn
workers wish to exchange labour for wage with newborn entrepreneurs,
and the output market opens at t+1 where the retired workers wish to
exchange their wage earnings for consumption with terminal firms.
Given Clower rule, workers want to be paid in money at t and firms
want to be paid in money at t+1. Consequently, entrepreneurs at t need
to collect the money equivalent of wages. This operation is made
possible by opening the credit market at each t.
2.2. The economy at work
The working of our sequential economy is described in figure 1
and explained below.
[Figure 1]
More specifically, the sequence of decisions in the economy
results as follows.
In t: a) each firm j plans the output level y(t)jt+1
b) it employs the relevant labour input njt, at the market
nominal wage rate st, and borrows the resulting wage bill stnjt
at the nominal gross rate (1 + rt) ≡ Rt;
c) each worker w offers 1 unit of labour in fixed amount at the
 nominal rate st, works and consumes his/her initial
 endowment x, and saves income st  at the rate Rt for
                                                                                                                       
Modelling thse choices would only add further parameters which are not
important in our context.
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 consumption in t+1
d) the bank lends to each entrepreneur the wage bill stnjt and
accepts from each worker the deposit st, both at the rate Rt
In t+1: a) each retired worker consumes his/her saving stRt
b)  each firm sells output at the market price pt+1 and may
be solvent or insolvent with the bank (see below)
As is clear from the above time structure of transactions, and in
force of the Clower rule, a "device" is needed in order to transform the
illiquid excess endowment of entrepreneurs into money. This function is
performed by banks7. The central bank is the sole banking institution in
the economy and performs three functions:
• it issues fiat money according to the Clower rule
• it acts as commercial bank, lending to entrepreneurs and offering
deposit services to workers, at the terms that will be specified below
• it finances public expenditure.
We straightforwardly assume a standard debt contract with the
exclusion of any risk on the part of the bank8. This type of debt contract
is a crucial element in our picture since it introduces a bankruptcy
clause in case of insolvency, and hence the selction mechanism in the
population of firms.  Therefore, each entrepreneur can obtain in t a loan
of size Bjt = stnjt from a bank, for 1 period, at the rate Rt provided that:
                                               
7This the same function attributed to banks in Kiyotaki and Moore's (1997)
economy.
8The standard debt contract (see e.g. Freixas-Rochet (1998)) is now a
workhorse in bank-firm models like the present one, though we do not prove
that this kind of contract is optimal in our setup. In fact, what we simply need
for our purposes is any financial arrangement which shifts the bankruptcy risk
onto the firm, since this is the way through which forecast errors beyond a
critical magnitude produce selection in the population of firms. For the same
reason, we also wish to exclude that the bank bears any risk.
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• the entrepreneur's excess endowment, xj − x, is given as collateral
• the entrepreneur is commited to the following repayment scheme in
t+1:
if pt+1y(t)jt+1 > BjtRt, the firm is solvent, pays BjtRt to the bank,
and the entrepreneur reappropriates his/her collateralized endowment
if pt+1y(t)jt+1 < BjtRt, the firm is insolvent, the bank seizes the
firm's revenue and possibly the collateral up to
pt+1(xbjt+1 + y(t)jt+1) = BjtRt + pt+1b
where b are fixed bankruptcy costs in real terms, and the firm is
declared bankrupt and exits from the market.9
Note that the above repayment scheme implies that the
entrepreneur faces two possibile lifetime consumption possibilities:
pijt+1 + xj  in case of solvency
xj − xbjt+1       in case of bankruptcy
where pijt+1 is the net real profit given by
 pijt+1 = y(t)jt+1 − BjtRt/pt+1
If we take the real value of debt as of t, Bjt/pt, substitute the expression
of Bjt, and define st ≡ st/pt as the real wage rate, qt ≡ pt+1/pt as the
growth factor of prices (inflation rate for short),  the net real profit can
be re-written as follows:
(2.1) pijt+1 = y(t)jt+1 − stnjtRt/qt+1
where stnjt is the real wage bill and Rt/qt+1 the (gross) real interest
rate.
                                               
9Note that, as a consequence, it must be that xj − x > xbjt+1, which we assume
is always satisfied.
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We first study the competitive general equilibrium solution of the
above model economy in the certainty case. Given the sequence
structure of decisions, certainty requires perfect foresight. In this case,
the solution is trivial, amounting to a simple exemplification of Say's
Law with money, and we only give it as a reference point.
Each entrepreneur's objective is to maximize the net real
profit10:
(3.1) max pijt+1 =  y(t)jt+1 − stnjtRt/qt+1
given the production function
y(t)jt+1 = nαjt α ∈  [0,1)
The choice variable is njt and the optimal labour input is the
function
(3.2) njt = (αqt+1/stRt)1/1-α
Since each worker offers 1 unit of workforce inelastically, njt is
also the size of employment by firm j, and is equal for all j. Aggregate
labour demand Nt is therefore nt times the measure of the
entrepreneurs' class, J. Total employment  cannot exceed the measure
of the workers' class, W. Since W = J, the labour market determines the
real wage rate st at full employment is such a way that
(3.3) (αqt+1/stRt)1/1-α = 1
(3.4) s*t = αqt+1/Rt
which also implies njt = 1, y(t)jt+1 = 1 for all j.
                                               
10Which, in our setup, is equivalent to maximizing lifetime consumption
possibilities.
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The bank pegs the nominal interest rate, and hence Rt, lends
s*tptW to entrepreneurs and receives the same amount as workers'
deposits; hence it always achieves balance-sheet equilibrium.
In t+1, aggregate full-employment output on sale is Y(t)t+1 = J =
W. Aggregate consumption consists of retired workers' and retired
entrepreneurs' consumption. A worker's consumption is given by his/her
real saving from previous period,
c(t)wt+1 = s*tptRt/pt+1
 = s*tRt/qt+1
which is therefore equal for all workers. Hence, substituting the value
for s*t, workers' aggregate consumption is
(3.5) C(t)wt+1= αW
In force of perfect foresight, entrepreneurs realize planned maximum
real profits after repaying debt, so that their aggregate (market)
consumption is
(3.6) C(t)jt+1 =  Y(t)t+1 − s*tRtW/qt+1
  = (1 −α)W
It is immediate to notice that, due to the transfer of labour
income to t+1 in the form of savings, Say's Law holds in t+1. This, as is
well-known, implies that the output market always clears at any price
level.
To determine pt+1 a monetary equation is introduced on the
grounds that, under the Clower Rule,  the total (outside) money stock
available in each t must exactly meet the demand for money, which in
this case amounts to the money value of output with unit velocity, i.e.:
(3.7) Mt+1 = Y(t)t+1pt+1
         = Wpt+1
Of course, classical (super)neutrality holds. In fact, let the central bank
create money at a gross rate ωt+1 = Mt+1/Mt. Since in equilibrium Mt =
Wpt, dividing both sides of equation (3.7) by Mt, we obtain
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(3.8) ωt+1 = pt+1/pt = qt+1
that is to say,  the price level grows at the growth factor of money.
6WDWLFV8QFHUWDLQW\DQGIDLOXUHV
In this section we introduce uncertainty. The only relevant
uncertainty in the model of section 3 is entrepreneurs' uncertainty at
time t over the inflation rate at time t+1, which affects firms' profit
maximization given by problem (3.1).
In this problem, qt+1 has to be replaced by an expectation that is
uncertain. As to expectation formation, we assume bounded rationality
(in Pesaran's sense (1987)), that is,
(A1) Each agent knows the variable's generation process but does
not know its exact specification
A fundamental reason behind this assumption is that the "true"
generating process is self-referential (i.e. it may differ from (3.8)) as will
become clear in due course.
4.1. Heterogeneous individual conjectures
We translate the previous assumption into our model by
associating to each entrepreneur born at t an individual specification of
equation (3.8) in the following "conjectural" form
(4.1) pejt+1 = ωt+1ujt
where ωt+1 is known with certainty (e.g. is announced by the central
bank in advance), and ujt represents the individual conjecture about the
relationship between the growth factor of money and the inflation rate.
Note that the "theoretical value" of ujt is 1.
The following additional assumptions complete our
characterization of entrepreneurs' individual beliefs.
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(A2) Individual conjectures ujt in each period's newborn
population of entrepreneurs are a continuous random variable Ut
uniformly distributed in the population, with strictly positive support
ujt ∈ [uLt, uHt], and density
(4.2) 
 ∈−=
−
elsewhere                   0
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Consequently, from (4.1) individual expectations qejt+1 also follow
a continuous uniform distribution, with strictly positive support
between the lower bound qeLt+1 = ωt+1uLt and the upper bound qeHt+1 = 
ωt+1uHt, and with mathematical expected inflation rate in the economy
qet+1   = Et(pejt+1)
= ωt+1Et(ujt)
= ωt+1(uHt + uLt)/2
(A3) Each entrepreneur, in turn, holds his/her inflation
expectation with a "tolerance interval" around qejt+1 of equal module
|δt|, i.e.:
qeLjt+1 = qejt+1 − δt  
qeHjt+1 = qejt+1 + δt
(A4) Individual conjectures ujt, and hence individual inflation
expectations qejt+1, are private non-observable information.
Note that, as a consequence, each individual entrepreneur does
not know the distribution of inflation expectations in the population,
and hence the population's expected inflation rate qet+1 is unknown too.
Now we can completely identify a population of firms in t with its
own three parameters:
• δt, tolerance
• µt = (uHt + uLt)/2, expected value of conjectures ujt
• ∆t = uHt − uLt, dispersion of conjectures ujt
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4.2. Individual decisions
Uncertainty, as defined above, modifies the entrepreneur's
decision problem. First, note that so far we have introduced uncertainty
in a "subjective" form since each entrepreneur holds his/her inflation
expectation within a range of values (assumption (A3)). Rationally, this
uncertainty has to be associated with a positive probability of
bankruptcy. In fact, assumption (A3) implies that the entrepreneur
expects that the actual inflation rate qt+1 may turn out to be different
from his/her individual expectation qejt+1, and it may happen to be too
low for the firm to be solvent with the bank.
We first give a measure of this "subjective" bankruptcy
probability implied by assumption (A3). From the debt contract
described in section 2, it follows that a firm is insolvent when its net
real profit is negative or
(4.3) qt+1 < stnjtRt/y(t)jt+1 ≡ vjt
i.e. if the actual inflation rate is lower than its real debt-output ratio,
that we define vjt.
Now let us define the bankruptcy probability of the firm as
(4.4) φjt ≡ Prob(qt+1 < vjt)
Since assumption (A3) describes the distribution of the entrepreneur's
price expectation, the measure of (4.4) implied by (A3) is:
(4.5) Fjt(vjt) = (vjt − qeLjt+1)(qeHjt+1 −  qeLjt+1)-1
 = 1/2 − (qejt+1 − vjt)/2δt
Therefore, the subjective bankruptcy probability of each firm,
• increases with vjt (a high real debt-output ratio makes insolvency
more likely)
• decreases with qejt+1 (a higher expected inflation rate makes
insolvency less likely)
We now examine the optimal output and employment decision.
Under debt contract, the firm's problem is to choose njt so as to
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max piejt+1 =  y(t)jt+1 − stnjtRt/qejt+1 − Fjt(vjt)b
The f.o.c. is the soluton of the following equation
(4.6) αnjtα−1 − (1 − α)(bstRt/2δ)njt−α − stRt/qejt+1 = 0
In order to obtain a closed-form solution we impose α = 0.5. The optimal
labour input results:
(4.7) n*jt = [(qejt+1/2stRt) − b/4δt]2
The first addendum is the same as in the case of certainty.
Therefore, we conclude that
• uncertainty reduces each firm's labour demand proportionally to the
marginal expected bankruptcy cost b/4δt
• each firm's labour demand differs by the individual expected inflation
rate qejt+1.
The marginal expected bankruptcy cost b/4δt (the increase in the
expected bankruptcy cost due to an increase in planned output,
employment and debt) is obviously increasing in the direct bankrupty
cost b while  is decreasing in δt up to the "certainty equivalent" value of
0 as δt → ∞. We interpret this as a measure of the "degree of tolerance"
of forecast errors. For instance, if δt is large the entrepreneur operates
under less strict forecast precision, and his/her labour demand is more
buoyant11.
4.3. Aggregate results
We have seen above that, owing to different individual expected
inflation rates, labour demand is now different across firms. For each
firm to employ one unit of labour force so as to ensure full employment
                                               
11Think of δt  as the diameter of the target in a rifle contest. The economic
meaning of δt is analogous to the degree of risk aversion, though we derive it as
an attitude towards errors rather than as a property of the utility function.
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as in section 3, each firm should be willing to pay the individual real
wage rate
(4.8) s*jt = βtqejt+1/2Rt
βt = (1 + b/4δt )−1 ∈ ]0, 1[
so that the mathematical expectation of the real wage rate in the
economy is
(4.9) E(s*jt) = βtµt/2Rt
Hence, ceteris paribus, uncertainty reduces Et(s*jt) relative to the
market value s*t under certainty by the factor βt. This factor captures
the effect of the marginal expected bankruptcy cost. Since b/4δt > 0,
generally βt < 1, and it decreases (increases) as b/4δt increases
(decreases) (see above for the interpretation of δt).
In t+1, aggregate output on sale is again Y(t)t+1 = W. However, as
is intuitive, bankruptcies break Say's Law since bankrupt
entrepreneurs cannot participate in market consumption. In Keynesian
words, bankruptcies operate as an endogenous source of effective
demand deficiency; since output is fixed by previous period's decisions,
the price level should adjust to clear the output market.
Let us first consider retired workers' consumption. This is given
by their real savings. Suppose that the announced increase in money
supply is realized in the form of a government per-capita monetary
transfer to retired workers mwt+1 entirely financed by printing money,
so that Mt+1 = Mt + mwt+1W = ωt+1Mt, or mwt+1W = Mt (ωt+1 − 1).
Consequently, the retired workers' real savings in t+1 are equal to the
real value of previous period's deposits and the money transfers and
therefore
(4.10) C(t)wt+1 = [ptE(s*jt)RtW + Mt (ωt+1 − 1)]/pt+1
Since Mt = Y(t-1)tpt, or Mt = Wpt, and considering the expression of
E(s*jt) (4.9), we can also write
C(t)wt+1 = (µtβt/2 + ωt+1 −1)W/qt+1
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As to retired entrepreneurs, since some firms may be insolvent,
and the corresponding share of entrepreneurs has zero income, the
retired entrepreneurs' consumption is limited to aggregate positive real
profits. In order to compute them, let us recall that a firm that operates
at the profit-maximizing real debt-output ratio
v*jt = s*jtn*jtRt/y*(t)jt+1
      = qejt+1βt/2
is solvent if
qt+1  > v*jt
i.e. if
(4.11) qejt+1 < qt+12/βt ≡ 1ˆ +tq   
In words, a firm turns out to be solvent in t+1 if its expected inflation
rate in t was no greater that the threshold level qt+12/βt, that we define
1ˆ +tq . Conversely, in t+1 there fail all firms that had "too optimistic"
inflation expectations in t exceeding 1ˆ +tq . Note the important points
that i) 1ˆ +tq  is the same for all firms, so that we can drop the index j,
and ii) it cannot be known in advance given our assumptions. This is an
important preliminary result on which we shall return later. Now we
proceed with the computation of aggregate positive real profits.
Aggregate positive real profits Πt+1 are the profits of all firms
with qejt+1 ∈ [qeLt+1, 1ˆ +tq ]. From (4.1) we can write the following
equalities:
qeLt+1 = ωt+1uLt
qejt+1 = ωt+1ujt
1ˆ +tq  = ωt+1 tuˆ
Using the definition of solvency, the definition of v*jt, and these
equalities, we can express the aggregate positive real profits in terms of
the primitives ujt and therefore
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We can now compute the equilibrium price level at t+1, which
must satisfy
(4.13) C(t)wt+1 + C(t)jt+1= W
The result is a quadratic function in qt+1:
(4.14) γ0q2t+1  + γ1ωt+1qt+1 + γ2ω2t+1 = 0
In terms of the population's parameters {βt, µt, ∆t}, the
coefficients of equation (4.14) result:
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4.4. Determination of the inflation rate
Equation (4.14) has two roots of generic form:
(4.15) q*t+1 = ktωt+1
where
(4.16) 

 γγ−γ±γ−
γ
= 2
2
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Before proceeding, note that (4.15) has the same form as the
"conjectural" equation used by entrepreneurs (4.1), and it correponds to
the "theoretical" model only when kt = 1. However, the "true" (or better,
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the structural) generating process is (4.15), not (4.1). Therefore, we can
put forward our first proposition
(P1) The inflation generating process in the economy is self-referential, in
that the relevant structural relationship  is a function of the parameters
characterizing the conjectures of the population about the structural
relationship itself.
Since γ21 − 4γ0γ2 > 0, equation (4.14) has two real roots, one of
which is surely negative and hence non admissible. For a positive real
root to exist it is necessary and sufficient that:
  (γ21 − 4γoγ2)1/2 > −γ1
and then take the root


 γγ−γ+γ
γ
−= 2
2
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Since there are three free parameters, it is not possible to find a
single constraint that satisfies this condition. Here we provide some
combinations of parameters that may be useful in the simulation. In
table 1 we take βt and µt as given, and for each combination between
them we indicate the range of values of ∆t that fulfills the condition kt >
0 (the values of ∆t in parentheses are implied by the chosen value of µt)
  
	
∆t 

ﬀ

ﬁﬃﬂ

ﬁ 
ﬀ
ﬁ"!$#
ﬁ %'&
()+* ,-. β / 0 µt
µt = 0.5
(∆t < 1)
µt = 1
(∆t < 2)
µt = 2
(∆t < 4)
βt = 0.5 ∆t > 0 ∆t > 0 ∆t > 0
βt = 0.8 ∆t > 0 ∆t > 0 ∆t > 0
The table shows that any heterogeneous population is consistent with a
positive root of the inflation equation for the chosen values of βt and µt.
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To gauge the relationship between the population's parameters
and the structural parameter kt, let us first consider the average
conjecture in the economy µt. The relationship between kt and µt is the
first indicator of the effect that the conjectures have on the structure of
the economy. For instance, when this relationship has positive sign,
conjectures tend to be self-fulfilling. Figure 2 shows that this is indeed
the case in our economy, where kt is plotted against µt for a given uL = 0
and two values of βt =0.5, 0.8. The figure also shows that the parameter
βt exerts a further effect of positive sign on the relationship between µt
and kt.
[Figure 2]
The economic reason of these results lies in the effect that
conjectures and the marginal expected bankruptcy cost have on
entrepreneurs' decisions. Since conjectures are bounded from below
(they cannot fall below uL = 0), an increase in µt is the result of a
greater upper bound uH, that is to say a larger tail of high-inflation
forecasters. These are prone to demand more labour and pay higher
wages which in turn will feed higher demand of retired workers.
Likewise, an increase in βt, i.e. a fall in the marginal expected cost of
bankruptcy, affects all ecntrepreneurs boosting their labour demand
and inducing them to pay higher wages.
As far as the other population's parameter is concerned, i.e. the
dispersion of conjectures ∆t, let us take as a benchmark µt = 1. This
corresponds to a case in which the conjectures of the population are on
average equal to the "theoretical value" of kt. Figure 3 shows that kt is
increasing in ∆t and that βt is a positive shifting parameter as before.
An increase in ∆t for a given µt corresponds to a so-called "mean
preserving spread" (MPS) in the population's conjectures, which implies
that both tails of low-inflation and high-inflation forecasters enlarge.
How these two forces combine to produce, ceteris paribus, a higher
inflation rate level depends on the working of the bankruptcy
mechanism in the economy that will be discussed below.
[Figure 3]
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4.5. Fixed points
A critical issue in all self-referential models is the existence of
fixed points in the map from the beliefs about a variable to the actual
value of that variable. This problem is important for two reasons which
relate to the notion of rational expectations (RE). The first is that if
such a fixed point exists we may then check wheteher it can act as an
attractor of beliefs under some law of motion of beliefs themselves. The
second is that, in a self-referential system, such a fixed point is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for the standard or "strong" notion
of RE (i.e. the case whereby beliefs coincide with the "theoretical" value
of the variable).  Indeed, as we shall see, in our system a fixed point
may exist in the map from conjectures to kt, but the latter may not
coincide with the "theoretical" value of 1. In other words, we need two
conditions for the "strong" REH to hold:
µt = kt
kt = 1
Knowing that
µt = uLt + ∆t/2
the following table reports the values of ∆t that satisfy the condition µt =
kt for given values of  βt and uLt
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uLt = 0 uLt = 1 uLt = 2
βt = 0.2 ∆t = 0.387
kt= 0.193
none (∆t = 0) none (∆t = 0)
 βt = 0.5 ∆t = 0.651
kt = 0.325
none (∆t = 0) none (∆t = 0)
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The noteworthy result is that fixed points µt = kt exist only in a
limited domain of values of the population's parameters. In that
domain, however, the "strong" RE hypothesis (µt = kt = 1) does not hold.
The conclusion is not that beliefs have no rational anchor, but that they
are self-fulfilling on a "non fundamental" equilibrium on average. Take
for instance the second row, first column in table 3. It shows that a
population born at time t characterized by the average expectation qet+1
= 0.325ωt+1, comprised between 0 and 0.651ωt+1, and with βt = 0.5 will
in fact generate an inflation rate qt+1 = 0.325ωt+1,  which is lower than
it would be under "strong" RE, i.e. qt+1 = ωt+1. See also figure 2, which
shows how the function kt(µt) intersects the locus kt = µt.
4.6. Bankruptcies
A key feature of our model is that firms may go bankrupt. This
event occurs because an entrepreneur in t may have an individual
inflation expectation too high, that is to say his/her qejt+1 exceeds the
threshold value given by (4.11). As already remarked above, this value
cannot be known in advance because it depends on what the actual
inflation rate qt+1 will be. But as we have seen, qt+1 is in turn a function
of the population's parameters, that is to say all uncertainty in the
economy is "endogenous" since it arises from the conjectures of
entrepreneurs ujt about the inflation generating process, and the self-
referentiality effect. In other words, we might say that whether a firm
fails or not in this economy only depends on relative expected prices.
In order to compute the share of firms that fail in each period, let
us recall that the insolvency condition is
qejt+1   > qt+12/β
or, in terms of ujt,
ujtωt+1 > ktωt+12/β
ujt > kt2/β ≡ tuˆ
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Therefore, in the first place, a necessary condition on the
population's parameters should hold for failures to occur, i.e.:
uHt  > kt2/β
or
 ∆t > kt4/β - 2µt
Table 4 reports the values of ∆t consistent with non-zero failures in the
economy for given values of µt and βt.
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µt = 0.5
(∆t < 1)
µt = 1
(∆t < 2)
µt = 2
(∆t < 4)
βt = 0.5 none* ∆t > 0.67 ∆t > 0
βt = 0.8 none+ ∆t > 0 ∆t > 0
∆*t > 3.0
∆+
t > 1.5
We observe that for failures to occur  the population should
display a critical combination of parameters. Intuitively, failures occur
as a result of a combination of large dispersion of conjuctures ∆t, and/or
high average of conjectures µt, and/or low marginal expected bankruptcy
cost (high βt). These three factors are consistent with the bankruptcy
mechanism in our economy: each of them, directly or indirectly, implies
a larger tail of firms on the high-inflation side of the population's
forecasts.
This intuition is confirmed by the computation of the share of
bankruptcies in the population, which is equal to:
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(4.17) φt+1 = 1 − F( tuˆ )
       = 1 − ( tuˆ − uLt)/∆t
       = 1/2 + (µt − kt2/βt)/∆t
i.e. a non-linear function of the population's parameters. Figure 4
portrays the function (4.17) for µt = 1 and βt = 0.5, 0.8 (see the third
column in table 4). When βt = 0.5, φt+1 increases with ∆t. Yet βt acts as a
positive shifting parameter. As βt changes from 0.5 to 0.8, bankruptcies
occur even at low levels of ∆t and are consistently larger than in the
previous case, though ∆t  now has a negligible effect.
[Figure 4]
 In the tables below we provide some numerical expamles of
comparative statics of different populations, and hence of different
resulting values of kt, tuˆ and φt+1
A) µt = 1, ∆t = 1 (uLt = 0.5, uHt = 1.5)
kt tuˆ φt+1
 βt= 0.5 0.354 1.416 8.4%
 βt= 0.8 0.453 1.13 36.7%
B) µt = 1, ∆t = 1.4 (uLt = 0.3, uHt = 1.7)
kt tuˆ φt+1
 βt= 0.5 0.376 1.505 13.9%
 βt= 0.8 0.482 1.205 35.4%
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Taking the two tables separately one can single out the effect of  
βt which, as explained above, measures the effect of the marginal
expected bankruptcy cost. Low expected bankruptcy cost (high βt) boosts
labour demand: wages rise, and so do demand and the future price level
(see effect on kt). On the other hand, the entrepreneurs' willingness to
pay a larger wage bill implies that borrowing increases; this is another
way, a way that looks at the increase in "inside" money, to explain the
upward pressure on the price level. On this front, two opposite forces
are at work. First, more borrowing means more bankruptcy risk on each
firm.  Second, a higher inflation rate is beneficial for it raises tuˆ and
makes it shrink the tail of firms bound to insolvency. The negative effect
on tuˆ of a greater βt in both tables indicates that the first force prevails
on the second, so that the share of bankruptcies eventually grows (see
the effect on φt+1). These examples point out a pattern where "inside"
inflationary conditions are associated with greater bankruptcy risk and
actual bankruptcies.
If one compares the two tables, one can gauge the consequences
of a MPS in the population's conjectures ujt. For βt = 0.5, the MPS has
an unambiguous "inside" inflationary effect combined with larger
bankruptcies for the reasons explained above. For βt = 0.8 the
inflationary effect of the MPS is instead accompanied with fewer
bankruptcies, which means that in this case the beneficial effect of
"inside" inflation prevails.
Finally, it may also be worth stressing that the bankruptcy rate
is independent of the (anticipated) rate of outside money growth.
Racalling that the marginal expected bankruptcy cost (the β-effect)
reduces the real wage bill relative to the certainty case and that actual
bankruptcies are a consequence of overproduction by some firms, one
might conclude that money transfers to workers should sustain
aggregate demand and reduce bankruptcies. This is not the case,
however, because the bankruptcy probability eventually depends on the
relative expected inflation of an entrepreneur: as long as money creation
is anticipated, it raises the expected inflation rate of all entrepreneurs
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uniformly thus leaving their relative positions and bankruptcy
probability unchanged.
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The previous sections set out the properties of an economy
characterized as a self-referential system fed by entrepreneurs'
conjectures about the inflation-generating process, and a failure
mechanism entirely determined by the self-referentiality effect of
individual conjectures and their heterogeneity. The results presented
above hold for a single two-period sequence taken in isolation and hence
are essentially comparative-static in nature.
The next natural step in the presence of failures is to move
towards population's dynamics in relation to two forces 1) selection, due
to the exit from market of bankrupt firms, 2) learning, due to the
incentive of incumbent entrepreneurs to avoid failure and/or to improve
their performance.
Each of the two evolutionary mechanisms requires non-trivial
assumptions and creates non-trivial analytical problems.
Selection. The first conceivable mechanism is that all insolvent
firms are eliminated from the population and replaced with new
entrants. Note that it may be necessary to distinguish between the
entrepreneur, who exits from activity after 1 period by assumption, and
the firm, which may be thought of as an institution that survives
generation after generation. Newborn entrepreneurs taking control of
pre-existing firms may also entrust the firm's memory of past
conjectures. Bu contrast, bankruptcy means that the institution is
destroyed with all its memory. Accordingly, newborn entrepreneurs
undertaking new firms can be modelled as endowed with randomly
generated conjectures and zero memory.
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Learning. The environment in which incumbent firms operate in
our model has two peculiar features that distinguish it form more usual
learning models.
First, the problem of the incentive to learn  arises. This problem
is substantially unaddressed in the literature. Note that each period
ends up with three classes of firms: a) insolvent firms, b) solvent firms
with profit lower than expected, c) solvent firms with profit greater than
expected. The class of firms a) has to be selected away as explained
above. What about the other two classes of firms? Suppose a survived
firm's memory at the end of t+1 contains (at least) the last conjecture
ujt, and this memory is handed down the incoming entrepreneur. The
rather natural question is: why the incoming entrepreneur should
engage in learning, that is to say why he/she should modify the
inherited successful conjecture? The argument that the inherited
conjecture was nonetheless incorrect is nonsensical, for the reason that
the probability of an exact forecast in our continuous setup is zero. The
argument that the firms in the class b) have an incentive to improve is
plausible, but obviously cannot be extended to class c).
Second, self-referentiality has a crucial implication for learning.
Classical learning models assume a stable structure of the object of
learning − the inflation generating process in our case. By contrast, self-
referentiality entails that the structure of the object of learning co-
evolves with the learning process. This property is quite clear in our
model. The structure of the inflation generating process consists of the
parameter kt. This parameter is a function of the population's
parameters {δt, µt, ∆t}. The selection mechanism, the substitution of
bankrupt firms with new ones, implies that t+1 starts with a modified
distribution of conjectures ujt+1, and hence with modified parameters
{δt+1, µt+1, ∆t+1}, with respect to the previous ones. Hence selection by
itself implies that kt changes over time. As a consequence,
• successful conjectures in one period may no longer be such in the
subsequent period
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• the process driving the dynamics of kt is fully determined by the
population's dynamics and, under our assumptions, is totally hidden
from individual agents' view
• large population innovations exert a negative externality on
incumbents (whether they are engaged in learning or not), whereas
conservative incumbents exert a positive externality on all incumbents
and learners in particular.
At the present stage of development of our research, we limit
ourselves to the analysis of the implications of self-referentiality under
the population dynamics generated by exits and entries, whereas we
substantially rule out learning by assuming that all entrepreneurs in
solvent firms do not revise the previous generation's conjecture. To
begin with, we also leave the parameters δt+1, ∆t+1 unchanged over
time.
5.1. Population's dynamics
Given the distribution of insolvent and solvent firms at the end
of any period t as explained in section 4, the former are driven out of the
market and replaced by new ones which leave the measure of the class
of entrepreneurs J unchanged.
Consequently, in any new period t+1 there exist two groups of
newborn entrepreneurs: those who run a pre-existing firm and those
who run a new one. Recall that the sole individual characteristic that
distinguishes entrepreneurs and firms is the conjecture ujt+1 whereby
each of them transforms the announced one-period growth rate of
money ωt+2 into a one-period inflation forecast pejt+2 = ujt+1ωt+2. We
assume that the entrepreneurs running pre-existing firms hold the
previous period's (successful) conjecture in the firm's "memory", ujt,
whereas the entrepreneurs running new firms form new individual
conjectures  following the same statistical law as their predecessors,
that is to say a uniform distribution with density f(ujt+1) and ujt+1 ∈
[uLt, uHt]. Also, all newborn entrepreneurs hold their individual
forecasts with the same tolerance parameter δt as in the previous
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generation, i.e. peLjt+2 = pejt+2 − δt, peHjt+2 = pejt+2 + δt. Being constant
over time, the parameters ∆ = uH − uL, and δ will be expressed without
time subscript.
5.2. The dynamics of the distribution of conjectures
The population dynamics described above brings as a major
implication a period by period modification of the distribution of
conjectures (and hence inflation forecasts) in the population of firms. We
first give an intuitive graphical rendition of this process.
[Figure 5]
The first panel in figure 5 portrays the initial uniform
distribution of conjectures at beginning of  period t with the parameters
given in the example A (first row) above, i.e. uL = 0.5, uH = 1.5, δ = 1 (β =
0.5). The second panel represents the consequence of the firms' exit
mechanism given that the insolvency threshold results tuˆ = 1.416 (with
8.4% of firms going bankrupt). The third panel exemplifies the
consequence of the new firms' entry mechanism: 8.4% of the previous
distribution above tuˆ  is removed and "spread" over the whole support
with the effect that the tail of conjectures below tuˆ is larger, while that
above tuˆ is smaller, than before. Therefore, though a mixture of two
identical uniform distributions, the resulting distribution is no longer
uniform. Owing to the assumption that the previous period's successful
conjectures are transmitted to the new entrepreneurs running pre-
existing firms while are also randomly represented among the new
entrepreneurs of new firms, these successful conjectures gain weight in
the population.
More formally, let us start form the original set of random
conjectures Ut uniformly distributed with density function f(ujt), ujt ∈
[uL, uH], in period t. The consequence of the exit mechanism is
equivalent to truncating the support of Ut at tuˆ  so that the conjectures
of solvent firms, Ust ∈ Ut, are realizations from the uniform random
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variable Ust ~ U(uLt, tuˆ ). The consequence of the entry mechanism in
period t+1 is that the conjectures are realizations from the random
variables Ut+1 and Ust according to the following law
(5.1) 


−+ tt
tt
s
t
quuUU
quuUU
1y probabilit  with ),(~ from
y probabilit with           )ˆ,(~ from
HL
1
L
 where
(5.2) LH
Lˆ
uu
uuq tt
−
−
=
 Consequently, the density function of conjectures in period t+1,
f(ujt+1), can be written as
(5.3) 
)()()1()()()( 1H,L121ˆ,L111 +++++ −+= jtuujttjttuujttjt
uIufquIufquf
 where f1 and f2 are two density functions defined as follows:
(5.4) 

 ∈−
=

 ∈−
=
+
+
+
+
elsewhere              0
],[      )()(
elsewhere            0
]ˆ,[      )ˆ()(
HL
1
1-LH
12
L
1
-1L
11
uuuuuuf
uuuuuuf
jt
jt
tjtt
jt
 and )( 1ˆ,L +jttuu
uI  and )( 1H,L +jtuu uI  are two indicator functions
defined as follows
34
(5.5) 



∉
∈
=



∉
∈
=
+
+
+
+
+
+
],[       0
],[       1
)(
]ˆ,[       0
]ˆ,[       1
)(
HL
1
HL
1
1H,L
L
1
L
1
1ˆ,L
uuu
uuu
uI
uuu
uuu
uI
jt
jt
jtuu
tjt
tjt
jt
tuu
 We are now in a position to compute the expected value of the
conjectures in period t+1, µt+1. Since the other two population's
parameters, ∆ and δ, are constant by assumption, µt+1 represents the
evolution of the population owing to the exit and entry mechanism. It
follows straightforwardly from (5.3) that
(5.6) 211 )1( µµµ ttt qq −+=+
 where
 µ1 = (uL + tuˆ )/2
 µ2 = (uL + uH )/2
 Let us now go back to figure 5 of which we can give a rigorous
quantification. The distribution of conjectures represented in the third
panel is the result of a mixture of the uniform distribution U(0.5, 1.416)
with probability 0.916, and of the uniform distribution U(0.5, 1.5) with
probability 0.084. Therefore, the density function of the conjectures of
period t+1 is
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 And, by applying (5.6), the expected value of conjectures results to be:
(5.9) µt+1 = 0.916×0.958 + 0.084 = 0.961
Unsurprisingly, the average conjecture in period t+1 is lower
than in period t (µt = 1). In fact, the lower tail of the previous period's
conjectures has gained weight in the new period's population of firms as
a consequence of the exit and entry mechanism. We have argued above
that in our economy the entrepreneurs who are bound to fail are those
whose conjecture lies above a threshold value which depends, inter alia,
on the average conjecture in the population. Should we expect a fall in
the share of bankruptcies, and can we conclude that the population and
conjectures dynamics that we have so far examined will, by expelling
over-optimistic conjectures, determine a period by period shrink of the
bankruptcy probability in the economy ending up with zero
bankruptcies? These are our matters of investigation on the long-run
properties of our economy.
5.3. Asymptotic properties of the economy
In this section we investigate the behavior of tuˆ  in the long run,
that is, more formally, we analyze the asymptotic properties of the
distribution of conjectures.
First, we look at the evolution of the parameters of the
distribution of conjectures over time. At time 0 the expected value is
given by 2/)(0 HL uu +=µ . From this expected value we get
)( 010 µgk =  and )(ˆ 020 kgu = . The functions 1g and 2g  are given by
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where ( )t0γ , 
( )t
1γ and 
( )t
2γ  are given in section 4.4. As we will see in a
moment, it is essential to check whether the functions 1g  and 2g  are
non-decreasing. This is obvious for 2g ; as for 1g , we proved, using the
Symbolic Math Toolbox of MATLAB, that it is increasing for any value
of [ ]HL uu ,∈µ .
Entrepreneurs whose expected value of conjectures is larger than
( )[ ]0120ˆ µggu =  go bankrupt and are excluded, so that the remaining
firms are distributed uniformly between Lu and 0uˆ . Then a new sample
is drawn from a ( )HL uuU ,  distribution.
The sampling scheme at time t=1 is therefore as follows: with
probability ( ) ( )LHL uuuuq −−= /ˆ01  we draw an observation from( )0ˆ,uuU L , with probability ( )11 q−  we draw an observation from( )HL uuU , . Formally, this means we sample from a mixture of these two
distributions, having density
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Notice that
Now, as the functions 1g  and 2g  are increasing, this implies 01 ˆˆ uu ≤ .
Firms whose expected inflation rate is larger than 1uˆ  go bankrupt and
are excluded so that at time 2 we sample from a mixture:
where ( ) ( )LHL uuuuq −−= /ˆ12 .
If the sequence { } Nttu ∈ˆ  is non-increasing, it is not difficult to see
that at time t we sample from a mixture
where ( ) ( )LHLtt uuuuq −−= − /ˆ 1
Thus the first thing we have to prove is that the sequence { } Nttu ∈ˆ
is non-increasing, because in this case the sampling scheme is
established for any Nt ∈ . After this, we will have to examine whether
the sequence converges.
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To begin, notice that the functions 1g and 2g used for computing
( )tt gk µ1=  and ( )tt kgu 2ˆ =  are known, so that we can put the problem
in the functional form ( )1ˆˆ −= tt ulu . With this notation we have the
following result: the sequence { } Nttu ∈ˆ  is non-increasing if and only if
( )xl '  is non-negative for any [ ]Ht uux ,ˆ∈ .
This statement can be proved by mathematical induction: we have
already  shown that 01 ˆˆ uu ≤ . Suppose now that 1ˆˆ −≤ tt uu . Then, under
the hypothesis that ( ) 0' ≥xl  tux ˆ≥∀ , we have
( ) ( ) 0ˆˆˆˆ 11 ≤−=− +− tttt uuulul .
To prove that the sequence converges, we use the fixed point
theorem [see, for example, Burden and Faires (1993), theorem 2.3]:
given the function [ ]baCg ,∈ , if ( ) [ ]baxKxg ,1' ∈∀<≤ , the sequence
( ) Nttt pgp ∈−= 1  converges to the unique fixed point in [ ]ba, . When
applied to our setup, the theorem says that, for the sequence { } Nttu ∈ˆ  to
converge, ( )xl '  must be smaller than one for any [ ]HL uux ,∈ .
The intersection of these two results implies that we need ( )xl '
to be non-negative for any [ ]Ht uux ,ˆ∈  and smaller than one for any[ ]HL uux ,∈ . The function ( )xl  is quite complicated and we used again
the Symbolic Math Toolbox of MATLAB to differentiate it. The first
derivative ( )xl '  is plotted in figures 6a to 6d for all the examples
considered, i.e. [ ] [ ]5.1,5.0, =HL uu , [ ] [ ]7.1,3.0, =HL uu , with 5.0=β  and
8.0=β . We see that the absolute value of the first derivative is smaller
than one for all values of interest. In addition, ( )xl '  is positive for "large
enough" values of x: in the examples considered, "large enough" means
larger than 1. There is no a priori guarantee that tu t ∀≥1ˆ : in general, it
will be necessary to check it at each iteration of the algorithm. In the
examples presented this is always true. So the general strategy, given
β , Lu  and Hu , consists in: (i) checking for which values of x  it holds
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that ( ) 1'0 <≤ xl ; (ii) running the process until the difference tt uu ˆˆ 1 −−  is
smaller than a prespecified tolerance level, checking at each iteration
that tuˆ  is such that ( ) 0' ≥xl , tux ˆ≥∀ .
In the table below we report the results obtained in the examples
considered; u* is the convergence value (in parntheses the number of
iterations)
A) uL = 0.5, uH = 1.5, µ0 = 1
k0 0ˆu φ1 *ˆu φ* µ* k*
 δ= 1 0.354 1.416 8.4% 1.390
(20)
1.2% 0.951 0.347
 δ = 4 0.453 1.13 36.7% 1.077
(12)
17.8% 0.878 0.431
B) uL = 0.3, uH = 1.7, µ0 = 1
k0 0ˆu φ1 *ˆu φ* µ* k*
 δ= 1 0.376 1.505 13.9% 1.464
(18)
2.8% 0.902 0.366
 δ = 4 0.482 1.205 35.4% 1.136
(12)
16.2% 0.832 0.454
Notice that the sequence always converges to a value u* inside the
interval [ ]HL uu , : this means that the proportion of firms that go
bankrupt is constant in the long run, and does not collapse to 0 or 1.
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We have studied a model of a macro-economy in sequential time
where the population of firms at each point in time is characterized by a
uniform distribution of individual unobservable beliefs about the
mechanism relating an observable market signal (the rate of increase of
outside money) and the future  inflation rate. As a consequence of
heterogeneous beliefs, a certain share of the population of firms can go
bankrupt and is driven out the market in each time period. The
bankruptcy mechanism is such that the probability for a firm to fail
depends on the parameters of the population's beliefs and its own
expected inflation relative to average. We have shown that within
consistent ranges of parameters, non-zero bankruptcies obtain. The rate
of bankruptcies in a given period results to be related to economically
palusible effects of the parameters of the population beliefs, but not to
the rate of money growth by itself (no money illusion)
Though markets are in equilibrium for incumbent firms' and
workers' exchanges, bankruptcies alter equilibrium properties
substantially. The system is also self-referential in that the actual
inflation rate in each period turns out to be a function of the parameters
of the population's beliefs. Given this property, and the share of
bankruptcies, the observed relationship between the growth rate of
money and the inflation rate is no longer equal the "fundamental" or
"theoretical" one. In fact, in the same ranges of parameters that yield
non-zero bankruptcies, we have explored the existence of fixed points in
the map that projects the averege expected inflation onto the actual one,
i.e. "cross-sectional" rational expectations, and we have found that
where such fixed points exist they do not coincide with the theoretical
value of the inflation rate. On the one hand, this result may be added to
the class of "self-fulfilling (average) prophecies", on the other, thinking
of  the self-fulfilled average expected inflation as an "anomaly" with
respect to the inflation rate that would prevail under homogenous
perfect foresight and no bankruptcies is misleading because
heterogeneous beliefs and non-zero bankruptcies are part of the
structure of the economy. The implication is rather that, normatively,
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the content of the rational expectations hypotesis should be extended to
include the bankruptcy-generating mechanism and the way it modifies
the structural relationship between the growth rate of money and the
inflation rate, which seems however contradictory with the existence
itself of bankruptcies.
Finally we have extended our analyis to the turnover of firms
along the sequence of periods. We have started form the simplest case:
bankrupt firms are "erased" (no information left to posterity) and
replaced by "blank" newcomers with beliefs randomly extracetd from
the existing distribution. Incumbent successful firms do not change
their beliefs nor do they engage in learning. This turnover mechanism
generates a dynamics of the distribution of beliefs: changes in the
distribution's parameters produce changes in the inflation rate and in
the bankruptcy rate period after period (successful firms in one period
may no longer be such in the next). Though successful firms are
predominant in each period and the bankruptcy rate tends to shrink, we
have found by numerical methods that the probability of bankruptcy
converges towards a non-degenerate limit value. In other words, in the
long run the economy displays a "structural" or "natural" rate of
bankruptcy such that all the previous properties described above hold.
Figure 1
Labour demand
credit demand
Production
Sale of
t output
t t+1
Debt repayment
or bankruptcy
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